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African borders today resulted from European colonial efforts during the 19th and 20th 
centuries. The nations, separated largely by the physical features of the land, cut across ethnic 
ties and divided ancient tribal communities. In many regions of the African continent, these new 
borders split powerful tribes making them minorities in the newly formed nations. In the process 
of decolonization, political allegiance often paralleled strict ethnic associations and the idea of 
self determination provoked movements in many parts of the continent. This universal right for 
people to determine their future political status has frequently brought conflict. With the United 
Nations’ strict limitations surrounding self determination and the many external interests that 
remained after the colonial period, communities in the process of self determination faced large 
barriers that often reinforced the authority of the European constructed borders. A 1963 decision 
by the Organization of African Unity recognized colonial borders as the basis of independent 
state borders, disregarding the ethnic and tribal separations formed by such boundaries.  This 1
declaration presented more difficulties to those attempting self determination. In the newly 
formed Republic of Congo, the Katanga province’s quest for self determination was an attempt 
to reconstruct a powerful tribe turned ethnic minority. Although undeniably shaped by external 
powers, indigenous leaders, specifically Moise Tshombe, spurred the Katanga secessionist 
movement by asserting an autochthonous identity as the foundation of their claim to statehood 
and forging alliances with powerful white settlers. Although unsuccessful in seccession, this 
pronouncement negated the efforts of Patrice Lumumba’s central government to create a unified 
Congo by strengthening ethnic authority in the richest province in the Congo Basin. 




Beginning in the late 1800s, the Congolese people sustained a series of oppressive 
governments, often prioritizing wealth over the good of the common people. King Leopold II of 
Belgium united the Congo basin in 1885, including two hundred fifty ethnic groups previously 
belonging to chieftain-kingdoms.  Leopold named this region ​Etat Independant du Congo ​or 2
Congo Free State (CFS), instigating forced labor policies to exploit the Congo’s wide array of 
natural resources, including rubber, ivory, and minerals such as copper, diamonds, gold, uranium 
(for nuclear technology), niobium, and tantalum (for space aeronautics).  Katanga, the most 3
economically important and minerally rich province of the newly formed CFS, faced the biggest 
changes. 
Previously controlled by the powerful Lunda-Bayeke kingdom, colonizers swiftly 
dissolved this empire’s rule, dividing the kingdom into three different regions: the Katangese 
province, parts of Angola, and Northern Rhodesia.  Once a robust political and military empire 4
feared for three hundred years from the Kasai highlands to Angola,  the Lunda empire was 5
conquered by a small yet powerful tribe of warriors known as the Bayeke. This tribe, led by 
Chief Msiri, migrated into the Lunda area of Tanganyika and overthrew the emperor, Mwata 
Yamo III.  In 1891, with the arrival of King Leopold II, a Belgian lieutenant killed Msiri in order 6
to solidify European power in the province. Belgium rule in Katanga brought a significant 
emphasis on education and infrastructure but neglected any initiation of economic and social 
2 Khaled Diab, “Congo’s Colonial ghost,” https://www.theguardian.com, (April 21, 2010). 
3 Diab, “Congo’s Colonial ghost.” 
4 ​Larmer, Miles and Erik Kennes, “Rethinking the Katangese Secession.” ​The Journal of Imperial  
and Commonwealth History​ 42, No. 4 (May 12, 2014): 741-761. https://doi-org.proxy.lib. 
pdx.edu/10.1080/03086534.2014.894716. 
5 ​Gonze, Collin. “Katanga Secession: The New Colonialism.” ​Africa Today​ 9, No. 1 (February 
1962): 4-16. ​http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.pdx.edu/stable/4184284. 




development within the region, instead, the colonists focused on “export-oriented economic 
activity.”  The Belgians initiated major limitations on internal travel for Katangese people and a 7
ban on political parties or alliances,  attempting to control their newfound population. These 8
measures inadvertently created isolated communities based on ethnic associations. In the 1960s, 
during “the rapid process of decolonisation,” a majority of political parties sprouted from deeply 
loyal ethnic communities, dividing the region’s political landscape into a fight for ethnic 
dominance.  9
Accounting for just 13% of the total population of CFS across a large expanse of land, 
Katanga’s mineral resources were easily subject to human exploitation. Due to Katanga’s sparse 
indigenous population, large corporations fueled mass migrations of Baluba Kasaian peoples to 
urban Katangese centers to bolster the workforce. The growing political mobilization of these 
“foreigners” worried many Katangese elites. In 1957, Kasaian migrants made up 22% of the 
population compared to 6.3% Lunda population.  Furthermore, during the 1957 elections in 10
Elisabethville, the economic center of Katanga, the four elected chief magistrates were all from 
non-indigenous ethnicities.  Desperately seeking the preservation of their power, Lunda elites 11
established ​Groupement des Associations de L’Empire​,  linking “contemporary political 12
expression to powerful pre-colonial identities.”  Gassomel proved ineffective in establishing 13
political success in the new democratic environment due to the increasingly small Lunda 
population. In realizing this, an alliance of indigenous elites across the Katanga province created 
7 ​Larmer and Kennes, “Rethinking the Katangese,” 744. 
8 ​Ibid, 744. 
9  ​Larmer and Kennes, “Rethinking the Katangese,” 744. 
10 ​Ibid, 745. 
11 ​Ibid, 745. 
12 The ​Groupement des Associations de L’Empire​ is also known as Gassomel. 




the ​Confederation des Associations Tribales du Katanga​.  The leaders of Conakat, most notably 14
Moise Tshombe, created an organization that simultaneously aligned itself with settler and 
mining interests while also remaining critical of the migration that supported the mining 
workforce.  The organization united most ethnic identities of the region, drawing power from 15
their alliance with colonial institutions.  
Efforts for political dominance by Conakat were interrupted in 1960 with the sudden 
news of an impending political independence for the Congolese. Patrice Lumumba, a member of 
the Congolese resistance, was elected on June 23, 1960 as “the first democratically elected prime 
minister” of the post-independence government.  Lumumba had pioneered Congolese 16
nationalistic ideals, consistently advocating for “uncompromised self determination,” and 
organizing democratic protests challenging Belgium for independent rule.  He called for 17
complete national unity, disregarding the great diversity present in the Congo Basin and 
threatening the powers that tribal chiefs had over their communities. In a speech at the 1961 
All-African Conference in Leopoldville, Lumumba championed independence declaring,  
“We were aware that as long as the country was dependent, as long as she did not take 
her destiny into her own hands, the main thing would be lacking [...] We have declared 
our desire for speedy independence without a transition period and without compromises 
with such emphasis because we have suffered more mockery, insults and humiliation 
than anybody else. What purpose could delays serve when we already knew that sooner 
14 ​The ​Confederation des Associations Tribales du Katanga​ can be shortened to Conakat. 
15 Larmer and Kennes, “Rethinking the Katangese,” 746. 
16 David, Smith, “Is colonialism still to blame for the Democratic Republic of Congo’s woes?” ​The Guardian, ​July 
3, 2010. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/04/colonialism-democratic-republic-of-congo- independence. 
17 ​Pak Nung Wong. “Discerning an African Post-colonial Governance Imbroglio: Colonialism, Underdevelopment 
and Violent Conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia and Sierra Leone.” ​African and Asian 




or later we would have to revise and re-examine everything? We had to create a new 
system adapted to the requirements of purely African evolution, change the methods 
forced on us and, in particular, find ourselves and free ourselves from the mental attitudes 
and various complexes in which colonisation kept us for centuries. We were offered a 
choice between liberation and the continuation of bondage. There can be no compromise 
between freedom and slavery. We chose to pay the price of freedom.”  18
His administration planned to increase taxation from 20% of receipts to 50% of receipts and to 
buy all shares of Katanga enterprises held by the Belgian government.  These decisions were an 19
attempt for greater autonomy and not unlike the neighboring taxation of 80% of receipts in 
Northern Rhodesian government coffers, a minerally rich area similar to Katanga.  These 20
limitations imposed on free enterprise alongside Lumumba’s controversial ethnic beliefs and aim 
for a unitary government, ensured an array of opponents in the Katanga province who viewed 
Lumumba as a radicalist. Lumumba’s election threatened Katangese elite, many of whom had 
strong ties to western powers, inciting fears of losing control of Katanga’s parliament. Tshombe 
consistently criticized Lumumba’s character and political ideals, calling him “an erratic 
demagogue.”  In 1960 amidst a crisis in the capital city after the mutiny of Lumumba’s troops, 21
Moise Tshombe declared Katanga’s independence from the Congo, eleven days after Congo’s 
independence from Belgium, accusing the central government of communist leanings.  
Without a stable military force, the capital of Leopoldville fell into turmoil leaving no 
options for engaging with the Katangese secession. Patrice Lumumba appealed to the United 
18 Schmidt, Thomas. “Speech at the All-African Conference in Leopoldville.” ​Marxists and Anti-Imperialists in 
Africa. ​https://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/lumumba/1960/08/25.htm.  
19 ​Gonze, “Katanga Secession,” 5. 
20 ​Gonze, “Katanga Secession,” 5. 




Nations but only received support to restore the capital area. He then appealed to the United 
States but the state department denied his request believing Lumumba exhibited communist 
ideals.  Without Katanga, 50% of the Congo revenue disappeared.  Out of desperation, 22 23
Lumumba requested aid from the Soviet Union to pacify the Katanga secession in August, 1960. 
The Soviet Union gave the Congo four planes full of military supplies.  This move provided 24
justification for western powers to assist in the removal of Lumumba from power. On September 
14, 1960, Joseph Mobutu overthrew Lumumba in a coup d’etat, sending him to Elizabethville 
where he was tortured and executed in January of the following year.  With ethnic associations 25
on the forefront of people’s mind, Godefroid Munongo and Moise Tshombe formed an alliance 
in an an attempt to reconstitute the Lunda-Bayeke empire as Katanga’s driving political force. 
Tshombe had married the daughter of a Lunda king and Munongo had close ancestral ties to the 
Bayeke leadership, together their alliances and contemporary roles in politics ensured support 
and resources.  Munongo became commander of the newly formed Katanga secret police which 26
employed many Belgian officers and mercenaries. After secession, he imprisoned the entire 
Katanga parliamentary opposition.  The total number of government officials is still unknown 27
though the police released 950 former parliamentary members in June, 1961.  Moise Tshombe’s 28
partnerships with a powerful array of entities including UK and Belgium government officials, 
22  ​Gonze, “Katanga Secession,” 5. 
23Ibid, 5. 
24 ​Ibid, 5. 
25 Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. “Mobutu Sese Soku.” ​Encyclopaedia Britannica​, October 10, 2018. 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mobutu-Sese-Seko. 
26 The assassination took place when the country had fallen under four separate governments, the central government 
in Leopoldville under Joseph Mobutu’s dictatorship leadership, a rival central government in Stanleyville  spurred 
by Lumumba's followers, and the secessionist government in Katanga (Moise Tshombe’s leadership) and South 
Kasai (Jason Sendwe’s party). 
27  ​Gonze, “Katanga Secession,” 4. 




mining companies, settlers, mercenaries, and Lunda-Bayeke tribal members, ensured his 
leadership tactics would not hinder the secession’s success.   29
Moise Tshombe and Godefroid Munongo asserted an indigenous ethnic identity as the 
basis of their claim to statehood. Fueled by the economic and political change brought by 
Belgian colonists, along with the assertion of power made by non-indigenous peoples, Katangese 
elite viewed the secession as a means to reinstate indigenous control. Founding a secessionist 
government on the ideals of the pre-colonial Lunda kingdom brought a unified history to a 
community seemingly unconnected while simultaneously connecting the elite to more 
impoverished masses. Godefroid Munongo and Moise Tshombe’s alliance exemplifies this 
attempt for historical interconnection, considering that both men often disagreed about the 
correct role of external powers in Katanga’s economy and government. In the summer of 1961, 
Munongo, sensing irrevocable tensions between Katanga and Belgium, publicly appealed to the 
Soviet Union for help. In that same statement, he called for an alliance with Antoine Gizenga, 
leader of the central government in Stanleyville, from which the two most powerful provinces 
could form a common front against Leopoldville.  Tshombe retracted the appeal shortly after, 30
attempting to maintain western support for the secession. Despite their differences, Moise 
Tshombe and Godefroid Munongo attempted to reconstruct the alliance between the Lunda and 
Bayeke tribes. Interestingly, they undertook these efforts while “express[ing] reservations about 
the idea that chiefs should be granted any exorbitant prerogatives.”  Instead, Katangese elite 31
forged the alliance while precariously balancing the amount of power delegated to the chiefs of 
29 ​Ibid, 5. 
30 ​Gonze, “Katanga Secession,” 4. 





the tribes in question. Facing Luba rebel fighting on the North border, “the chiefs were too 
essential to the internal order and security of the beleaguered state to be pacified with titles and 
trinkets.”  Instead, chiefs were given ambiguous authorities and promised “a share of executive 32
power at the local level,” a promise that never fully came to fruition.  Hoping to maintain a civil 33
government, Tshombe and Munongo spread this autochthonous identity through public and 
media space, calling for chiefs to extend support for the secession as well.  
This emphasis on ethnic loyalty, although a basis for unification, also alienated other 
powers in the region. The initial threat posed by Kasain immigrants strengthened after secession 
as “the presence of ‘alien’ elements whose language, customs, and traditions differed 
considerably from those of the resident tribes [had] made them all the more conscious of their 
mutual differences.”  Previous election results had revealed the distinctive tribal groupings and 34
reinforced their solidarity. In 1959 Conakat’s increasingly xenophobic attitude created serious 
internal stresses for the party.  When Conakat declared its support of a Katangese government 35
approportioned by “authentic Katangese,”  the ​Association des Baluba du Katanga​ (Balubakat) 36
withdrew from the party. The change was “indicative of the ethnic solidarity prevailing among 
the Baluba: if substantial cultural differences existed between the Kasain tribes and those of the 
Katanga, they are at any rate not so fundamental as to leave each indifferent to the other’s fate.”  37
In instances such as this, ethnicity serves as both a unifying and dividing force, precariously 
balancing peace and conflict. This competition between the Conakat and Balubakat, both major 
32 Bustin, ​Lunda​, 204. 
33 ​Ibid, 204. 
34 Rene ​Lemarchand, "The Limits of Self-Determination: The Case of the Katanga Secession." ​The American 
Political Science Review​ 56, no. 2 (1962): 406. https://doi.org/10.2307/1952375. 
35 ​Lemarchand, “Limitations of Self-Determination,” 411. 
36 Larmer and Kennes, “Rethinking the Katangese,” 746. 




constituent units, accelerated with the emergence of electoral campaigns, sometimes ending in 
bloodshed. The political and social changes aligning with new democratic institutions tightened 
ethnic association, causing “alternative ‘autochthony’/’allochthony’ dichotomies.”  These 38
increases of such dichotomies paralleling autochthonous or allochthonous principles distinctly 
manifested itself in the election results of June 1959. After first predicted to equal one another, 
unforeseen events skewed the parliamentary seat election results in Conakat’s favor.  Balubakat 39
members claimed they were victims of election fraud, exasperating already tense relations.  40
When Tshombe declared a Katanga secession, Jason Sendwe, the leader of the Balubakat party, 
retaliated by formally recognizing the Lumumba administration. This recognition provided the 
basis for the region to challenge the secessionist regime, declaring an independent “Province of 
Lualaba” in October 1960. The new state formed an alliance with Stanleyville Lumumbists and 
Tshombe was made to recognize the loss of northern and central Katanga.  41
The tendency to identify ethnic loyalties in political allegiance was also aggravated by 
the presence of a politically conscious settler community, often allying themselves with the 
native Lunda and Bayeke leaders. Undoubtedly, the Katanga secession “benefited powerfully 
during its initial period from crucial military and technical assistance extended by Belgium.”  42
Moise Tshombe’s strategically placed partnerships with both Belgian settlers and mercenaries 
ensured broader economic and political gains towards Tshombe’s career. Even after the UN 
deported all mercenaries in Katanga, white settlers supplied Tshombe with military leadership in 
38 Erik Gobbers, “Ethnic associations in Katanga province, the Democratic Republic of Congo: multi-tier system, 
shifting identities and the relativity of autochthony.” ​The Journal of Modern African Studies​ 54, No. 2 (June 2016): 
211-236. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X16000185. 
39 ​Lemarchand, “Limitations of Self-Determination,”, 413. 
40 ​Ibid, 413. 
41 ​Bustin, ​Lunda​, 201. 




exchange for the preservation of their privileges, rather than a unified Congo.  This partnership 43
allowed a strong military power to emerge in Katanga, solidifying efforts for maintained 
autonomy. 
Moise Tshombe excelled in his manipulation of multiple entities to secure wealth and 
prestige during the Katanga secession, playing on already tense ethnic associations and revealing 
himself as an independent agent. Both historians and Tshombe’s contemporary counterparts 
simply viewed him as a puppet for foreign powers to use. Lumumba once said, “Tshombe is 
simply an instrument of the Belgians,” yet research implies a firm awareness of global relations. 
This orthodox perspective undoubtedly promoted the destruction of Lumumba’s career in 
establishing powerful enemies with strong internal goals. Conakat’s accumulation of power 
throughout Katanga did not signify a reconstruction of the Lunda-Bayeke empire but rather the 
increase of wealth and prestige for the Tshombe family. While colonial powers may have 
provided extra monetary support, especially when threatened by the nationalistic ideals of 
Lumumba’s administration, Tshombe sought a secession in hopes of establishing personal power 
in a minerally rich region in the heart of Africa. Tshombe clearly distinguishes a beneficial 
partnership from one that exploits him in leadership. In March of 1960, Tshombe exploded at the 
Conakat Executive Council meeting asserting “... that he no longer intended to be for sale to the 
settlers. ‘These gentlemen have collected much money in Conakat’s name. They have made 
themselves the keepers of our money… The financial situation is in the hands of the settlers; the 
breach must be clear and even brusque.’”  Having firmly established relationships with 44
European government officials, large local corporations, and the settler population, these 
43 ​Gonze, “Katanga Secession,” 16. 




loyalties did not prevent Tshombe from compromising his own political agenda. The 
Lunda-Bayeke alliance for recreating a historical empire merely veiled Tshombe’s plans of 
increased domination.  
Considering the United Nations requirements to achieve autonomy based on 
self-determination, Katangese authorities failed to create an adequate governing body. “‘The 
freedom of the people of the territory to choose the form of government which they desire,’ and 
‘freedom from interference by another government as to internal affairs’ are essential”  45
components of establishing an independent will of the people. One must also consider the 
general welfare of the Katangese involved and “the economic deprivations entailed by the 
secession.” Such insecurities risked the entire survival of many Katangese communities, clearly 
failing to meet the requirements of self-determination.  Even more prevalent was the threat of 46
global consequence if the Congo’s four separate governments each attained autonomy. Caught 
up in the politics of the cold war, The USSR openly backed the Stanleyville government led by 
Antoine Gizenga, Lumumba’s deputy prime minister of the new Republic of Congo, since the 
Parti Solidaire Africain​ appealed to a modern idea of governance by crossing ethnic loyalties. 
With this support, it was possible for Gizenga to create a viable state. “From the standpoint of 
the internal political situation in the Congo, the secession would have played directly into the 
hands of the Gizangists and perhaps have invited a much firmer ‘commitment’ on their part than 
presently exist[ed], thereby making the prospects of national unification all the more distant.”  47
Each of these factors led the United Nations to condemn the Katanga secession in hopes of a 
unified Congo state. Internationally led efforts were undertaken to restore the authority of the 
45 Lemarchand, “Limits of Self-Determination,” 416 
46 ​Ibid, 416. 




moderate and pro-western regime in Leopoldville over the entire country, in order to prevent an 
aggressive, left-leaning state with Soviet backing in the heart of Sub-Saharan Africa.   48
These external powers, although a major part of the secession’s demise, also provided the 
resources for Moise Tshombe to initially declare the movement and solidify power. While it is 
important to understand these complex relations between external powers and indigenous leaders 
in Katanga, very little information displays the collective will of the people. Strong leaders 
monopolized the media as well as the Katangese secessionist government. Their aims of great 
power and wealth left their people without resources, economically or socially. Tshombe had 
attempted to bring a unifying identity to the Katangese people in order to form a strong nation 
yet he neglected the overall needs of the people, opting for wealth and power towards his own 
family. This corrupt style of government which focuses on internal greed rather than the 
common good has prevailed in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Today, one of the most 
minerally rich countries in the world is also one of the poorest and ethnic divisions remain a 
large source of conflict. These deeply held loyalties -- qualities that often form the cultural, 
social, and spiritual foundation for an individual -- may at times unify a community, but if 
threatened, ethnic associations also have the power to rip apart communities as individuals strive 
to preserve those qualities of life that are most important. 
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